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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law—Equal Protection—Mandatory Referendum
on Low-Income Housing—James v. Valtierra. 1 —Citizens of both San
Mateo County and the City of San Jose, California, eligible for low-
income public housing, had been placed on the public housing lists by
their respective local housing authorities for periods ranging from three
months to thirty-three months. 2 More than 2,779 families in San Mateo
County and the City of San Jose shared this list. The majority of the
people were members of racial minorities: those in San Mateo were
predominantly black and those in San Jose were predominantly
Mexican-Americana To meet the housing needs of these families, the
housing authorities of San Mateo and San Jose sought to obtain federal
funds made available through the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). However, the local housing authorities were
unable to apply for federal funds to construct low-rent public housing
because proposals for such housing units had been defeated in manda-
tory public referenda pursuant to Article XXXIV of the California
State Constitution, which provides that:
No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed,
constructed, or acquired in any manner by any state public
body until, a majority of the qualified electors of the city,
town or county, as the case may be, in which it is proposed
to develop, construct, or acquire the same, voting upon such
issue, approve such project by voting in favor thereof at an
election to be held for that purpose, or at any general or
special election.'
Unable to occupy public housing, the low-income citizens of San Mateo
County and San Jose sought a declaration that Article XXXIV was
unconstitutional, and that the defendants° be enjoined from complying
with its requirements.
A three-judge federal court for the Northern District of California
held Article XXXIV to be violative of the Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution and issued the injunction.° In making
1 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
2 Brief of Appellees at 22, James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
Id. at 25.
4 Cal. Coast. art. XXXIV 1.
5
 The defendants in Valtierra were The Housing Authority of the City of San Jose,
The City Council of San Jose and The Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) and its Secretary, George Romney. HUD and Secretary Romney were dismissed
as party defendants by the district court. 313 F. Supp. 1, 3 (1970).
a Valtierra v. Housing Authority of the City of San Jose, 313 F. Supp. 1 (N.D.
Cal. 1970).
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this determination, the court relied primarily on the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Hunter v. Erickson.' In Hunter, the
Supreme Court had held constitutionally invalid an amendment to the
City Charter of Akron, Ohio, which required a referendum before any
fair housing ordinance could be enacted. The Court found that the
amendment, by treating racial housing matters differently from other
housing matters, created an explicit racial classification which subjected
persons interested in such housing to a greater procedural burden than
those concerned with other types of real property legislation, and was
therefore violative of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court
in Valtierra, applying this rationale, reasoned that " [h]ere, as in the
Hunter case, the 'special burden' of a referendum is not . . . required;
here, as in the Hunter case, the impact of the law falls upon minor-
ities."' The court concluded that, even though federal assistance to
housing was a privilege that California was not obligated to seek, "the
requirements of equal protection must still be met."° The Supreme
Court, however, found that the district court had erred in its reliance
on Hunter and, in reversing, HELD: the California referendum pro-
cedure is not violative of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court
found that, unlike the Akron referendum in Hunter, California's
referendum did not rest on "distinctions based on race" because
Article XXXIV applied to all low-income housing projects, not just
those to be occupied by a racial minority." In addition, the Court
stressed that the referendum procedure gave all the people "a voice
in a decision which may lead to large expenditures of local govern-
mental funds for increased public services and to lower tax revenues.""
In Valtierra, the Supreme Court appears to have ignored the
potential for racial discrimination posed by Article XXXIV. Racial
minorities represent a disproportionately large percentage of low-
income families," so that any legislation which subjects proposals for
7 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
313 F. Supp. at S.
° Id.
10
 402 U.S. at 141. Compare the Supreme Court's reasoning with the lower court's
determination that:
Although Article XXXIV does not specifically require a referendum for low-
income projects which will be predominantly occupied by Negroes or other
minority groups, the equal protection clause is violated if a "special burden" is
placed on those groups by the operation of the challenged provision, if "the
reality is that the law's impact falls on the minority."
313 F. Supp. at 4, citing Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. at 391.
11 Id. at 143.
12
 "Low income families . . . usually—if not always—are members of minority
groups." Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization (SASSO) v. City of Union
City, 424 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1970). As of 1968, 56% of the nation's nonwhite families
lived in central cities and two-thirds of those so situated lived in neighborhoods with sub-
standard housing. Report of the Nat'l Advisory Comm'n on Civil Disorders 467 (1968).
604
CASE NOTES
low-income housing to a mandatory referendum necessarily provides
an electorate the opportunity to frustrate racial minority interests."
Moreover, the Valtierra Court not only refused to recognize the "use
of economic measures as a subterfuge for racial discrimination,'" but
tacitly approved economic discrimination as a basis upon which housing
opportunities for the poor may be legally denied.
In 1937, Congress responded to the housing needs of the poor by
instituting a series of federal building programs to improve low-
income housing conditions. In the Housing Act of 1937," Congress
declared that it was the policy of the federal government to employ
its funds to assist state and local governments in remedying "the unsafe
and insanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent,
safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low income . . . that are
injurious to the health, safety, and morals of the citizens of the
Nation.'" In 1949, Congress amended its national housing policy to
include "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every
American family. . . ." 17 One of the newly stated congressional objec-
tives was "the development of well-planned, integrated, residential
neighborhoods. . .”" In 1968, Congress reaffirmed that objective and
recognized that to achieve such a goal the nation needed, within a
decade, construction or rehabilitation of six million housing units to
serve the needs of low- and moderate-income persons." To implement
these policies, federal legislation authorized the use of federal funds
for the construction and operation of public housing projects, 2° and
offered federal financial assistance to local housing authorities for
planning and developing low-income housing. The Department of
Further, 41% of nonwhite families were considered to be in poverty in 1966 as compared
to only 12% of the white population. Id. at 258.
13 A recent study has concluded that the "desire to keep the poor physically at a
distance" and "deep racial prejudice" are two factors which substantially influence the
electorate when voting on low-income housing matters. National Comm'n on Urban
Problems Report (Building the American City), H.R. Doc. No. 34, 91st Cong. 1st Sess.
129 (1968).
14 Remarks of President Nixon, quoted in The Wall Street Journal, June 14, 1971,
at 6, col. 1.
When such an action [i.e., the use of economic discrimination as a subterfuge
for racial discrimination] is called into question . . . we will study its effect. If
the effect ... is to exclude Americans from equal housing opportunity on the
basis of their race, religion or ethnic background, we will vigorously oppose it
by whatever means are most appropriate—regardless of the rationale which may
have cloaked the discriminatory act.
Id.
15 42 U.S.C. 1401 et seq. (1970).
10
 42 U.S.C. if 1401	 (1970).
17 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
18 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
10 42 U.S.C. 1441a (1970).
2° 42 U.S.C. ff 1409-11	 (1970).
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Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was authorized to provide:
(a) preliminary loans to local public housing authorities to assist in
the planning of low-rent projects;" (b) loans to assist in the develop-
ment, acquisition, and administration of low-rent projects ; 22 (c) annual
contributions to assist in achieving and maintaining the low-rent
character of the housing projects; 23 and (d) in special circumstances,
capital grants.24
In 1938, the California Legislature enacted the Housing Author-
ities Law" to make the benefits of the federal Housing Act available to
those of its counties and cities where a need for low-income housing
had been declared. This statute provided that a local housing authority
was to be formed in each county and city. The authority, however,
could not exercise its powers until the governing body of each county
and city declared that there was a need for low-income housing."
Essentially, under this state law, once a need for low-income housing
was recognized and a housing authority activated, the local governing
body could proceed with the construction of a housing project after
applying for a preliminary federal loan to finance the project," and
agreeing with the local housing authority to provide the requisite local
cooperation.28
Prior to enactment of the California Housing Authorities Law, a
general referendum power had been vested in the California electorate
by the state constitution. This right reserved to the people "the power
to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution, and to . . . adopt
or reject any act . . . passed by the Legislature."" However, in 1950,
the Supreme Court of California held that the acts of a local governing
body and housing authority under the Housing Authorities Act of
21 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7)(a) (1970).
22 42 U.S.C.	 1409 (1970).
23 42 U.S.C. 11410 (1970).
24 42 U.S.C. I 1411 (1970).
26 Cal. Health and Safety Code §f 34200 et seq. (West 1954). The statute contained,
inter alia, specific legislative findings that insanitary and unsafe dwelling accommodations
exist in places within the state where persons of low income are found to reside; that
there is a shortage of safe and sanitary dwelling accommodations available at rents which
low-income people can afford; and that such conditions constitute a menace to the health,
safety, morals and welfare of the residents of the state. Cal. Health and Safety Code
§ 34201 (West 1954).
23 Cal. Health and Safety Code § 34240 (West 1954).
2T 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7)(a) (i) (1970). This loan, however, will not be approved by
HUD unless the local housing authority demonstrates that there is a need for such low-
rent housing which is not being met by private enterprise. 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7)(a) (ii)
(1970).
28 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7) (b) (i) (1970).
20 Cal. Const. art. IV § 1 (emphasis added). The legislative initiative and referendum
thus granted the electorate was adopted in California and 21 other states as part of the
progressive reform program during the early 1900's. See Comment, The Scope of the
Initiative and Referendum in California, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 1717 (1966).
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California were not subject to the electorate's referendum power be-
cause they were "executive and administrative" in nature rather than
"legislative." The state constitution was then amended by referendum
to include Article XXXIV, which specifically required prior referendum
approval for the construction or acquisition of low-income housing 8 1
It was this specific requirement of Article XXXIV which the Supreme
Court in Valtierra upheld as constitutional.
The Court determined that Article XXXIV was not racially dis-
criminatory. It noted that "the record here would not support any
claim that a law seemingly neutral on its face is in fact aimed at a
racial minority." However, since low-income families "usually—if not
always—are members of minority groups," 33 it is submitted that the
Court should have considered the "utimate effect" of Article XXXIV
in order to recognize that this provision provides a "sophisticated means
of invidious discrimination."" In failing to consider the discriminatory
effect of Article XXXIV, the Court ignored its earlier decision in
Reitman v. Mulkey," which provided the judicial touchstone for ap-
praising the constitutionality of statutes and official acts that are
allegedly discriminatory.
In Reitman, a husband and wife alleged that the owner of an
apartment complex had violated California's open housing statutes"
by refusing to rent an apartment to them on account of their race. The
no Housing Authority v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 550, 219 P.2d 457 (1950).
81 It should be noted that the general referendum provisions of Article IV of the
California Constitution merely provide a review referendum. Only when a designated
percentage of the electorate signs a petition in opposition to a legislative enactment is
that enactment submitted to the voters for review at the polls. Cal. Const. art. IV 1.
By comparison, Article XXXIV requires mandatory prior approval of the electorate
before any Iow-rent housing is constructed. The only other class of governmental decision-
making subject to this type of referendum is the decision of a county, city, or school
district to assume any long-term indebtedness under a general obligation bond. Cal.
Const. art. XIII § 40.
82 402 U.S. at 141.
88 See note 12 supra.
84 Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 293 F. Stipp. 301, 306 (W.D. Mich. 1969). One com-
mentator has noted that:
An "invidious" classification or trait is one which combines . . . three qualities:
(1) a general ill-suitedness to the advancement of any proper governmental
objective; (2) a high degree of adaptation to uses which are oppressive in the
sense of systematic and unfair devaluation, through majority rule, of the claims of
certain persons to nondiscriminatory sharing in the benefits and burdens of social
existence; (3) a potency to injure through an effect of stigmatizing certain persons
by implying popular or official belief in their inherent inferiority or undeserving-
ness.
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7, 20 (1970).
35 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
80 Cal. Health and Safety Code § 35700-44 (West 1967); Cal. Civ. Code §{ 55-52
(West Supp. 1971).
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apartment owner claimed that the open housing statutes were nullified
by the subsequent enactment of Proposition 14, which provided, in
pertinent part, that:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall
deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any
person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part
or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such
property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute dis-
cretion, chooses."
The Supreme Court held Proposition 14 unconstitutional—a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. In making this determination, the
Court did not merely consider the wording of the enactment, but also
considered its immediate objective, ultimate effect and historical con-
text.
The Court held that the "ultimate effect" of the enactment was
more than a repeal of open housing legislation; that the provision
amounted to state encouragement and authorization of private dis-
crimination," and, as such, was violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In marked contrast, the Valtierra Court, in examining the effect
of Article XXXIV, did not employ the "ultimate effect" test of
Reitman. If this test had been applied to Article XXXIV, Valtierra
might have been decided differently. The California referendum pro-
cedure at issue pertains solely to low-income housing, which is a matter
of peculiar interest to the indigent faction of our society. Since that
segment of society is primarily composed of racial minorities, it
would appear that the "ultimate effect" of the referendum is an
encouragement and authorization of private discrimination.
More recently, in Hunter v. Erickson," the Supreme Court pro-
vided a narrower test upon which Valtierra could have been decided. In
Hunter, the Supreme Court struck down the requirement of an Akron
city charter that all open housing legislation be submitted to a referen-
dum." The Court abandoned the "ultimate effect" approach of Reit-
87 Proposition 14 is reprinted in 387 U.S. at 37 .1.
88 When Proposition 14 was submitted to the voters it was passed by a vote of
4,526,460 to 2,395,747. Mulkey v. Reitman, 50 Cal. Rptr, 881, 892, 413 P.2d 825, 836
(1966). For the conclusion that the result was attributable to racial prejudice, see
Wolfinger and Greenstein, The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of
Referendum Voting, 62 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 753 (1968),
89 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
40 The city charter provided that:
Any ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron which regulates
the use, sale, advertisement, transfer, listing assignment, lease, sublease or financ-
ing of real property of any kind or of any interest therein on the base of race,
color, religion, national origin or ancestry must first be approved by a majority
of the electors voting on the question at a regular or general election before said
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man and adopted an "equal burden" test. The Court ruled that the
Akron referendum requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause
because it subjected persons interested in open housing legislation to a
greater procedural burden than it did those concerned with other types
of real property legislation. Furthermore, the Court specifically found
that the referendum was inherently a greater burden for racial minor-
ities. Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice White stated:
[T]he reality is that the law's impact falls on the minority.
The majority needs no protection against discrimination and
if it did, a referendum might be bothersome but no more than
that. Like the law requiring specification of candidates' race
on the ballot . . . [the open housing referendum requirement]
places special burdens on racial minorities within the govern-
mental process. This is no more permissible than denying
them the vote, on an equal basis with others 4t
It is submitted that the equal burden test in Hunter should pro-
hibit legislation which subjects racial minorities interested in access
to government-assisted housing to the burden of a referendum. This
is not to say that equal protection is denied racial minority groups
merely because their ranks are fewer in number. Rather, equal protec-
tion is denied when the state places a greater procedural burden on
persons interested in government-assisted low-income houSing—usually
racial minorities—than on persons interested in other kinds of govern-
ment-assisted housing. The Valtierra Court, however, eschewed the
procedural burden approach adopted in Hunter on the grounds that the
Akron amendment had explicitly applied to racial minorities, whereas
the provisions of Article XXXIV made no mention of race. However,
in so distinguishing Hunter, the Valtierra Court failed to recognize
Hunter's implication that the Court should not uphold a state's dis-
tribution of legislative power if it places a procedural burden on racial
minorities and impedes their access to housing.
The Valtierra Court failed to rectify the potential inequities of
local rule by refusing to invalidate a referendum which could substan-
tially restrict equal housing opportunities for minority groups. How-
ever, recent lower federal court decisions have enjoined referenda
which would prevent equal access to housing even though a deliberate
legislative intent to exclude economic and racial minorities was not
expressed. In Otey v. Common Council of the City of Milwaukee, 42
ordinance shall be effective. Any such ordinance in effect at the time of the
adoption of this section shall cease to be effective until approval by the electors as
provided herein.
Akron, Ohio, Charter § 137, cited in 393 U.S. at 387.
41 393 U.S. at 391.
42 281 F. Supp. 264 (ED. Wis. 1968).
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the plaintiff, a black resident of Milwaukee, sought to enjoin the City
Council from submitting the following resolution to the electorate for
referendum approval:
BE IT RESOLVED:
That the Common Council of the City of Milwaukee SHALL
NOT enact any ordinance which in any manner restricts the
right of owners of any real estate to sell, lease, or rent private
property.'
Although the proposed resolution did not serve to repeal any open
housing laws, the federal district court applied the ultimate effect test
espoused in Reitman and determined that the proposal was dis-
criminatory." In reaching this decision the court noted the existing
racial housing patterns in Milwaukee, the failure of previous attempts
to obtain open housing in that city, and the existing hostile racial
climate. The court decided that, in light of the racial tension which
permeated the local citizenry, the purpose and ultimate effect of the
resolution was to encourage private discrimination. In marked contrast
to the Valtierra Court's assertion that "referendums demonstrate de-
votion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice,"" the
Otey court disregarded the "fallacious assumption that the 'will of the
electorate' should invariably prevail. . .""
In Ranjel v. City of Lansing,47 the district court relied on Reitman
and Otey and also invoked the Supremacy Clause to enjoin a referen-
dum intended to repeal a zoning ordinance permitting the construction
of a HUD-sponsored low-rent housing project within an all-white
neighborhood. The district court relied on both Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964" and HUD regulations in determining that federal
law required the selection of low-income sites outside areas of racial
concentration. In addition to determining that the referendum, if
48 Reprinted in 281 F. Supp. at 267.
44 In a similar case, the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan employed
the Reitman rationale to strike down a referendum on open housing. In Holmes v. Lead-
better, 294 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Mich. 1968), the city council of Detroit had enacted open
housing legislation in 1967. In 1968, a petition for referendum to repeal that legislation was
circulated and listed for the following election. Black residents of Detroit sought to re-
strain the submission of the housing law to the electorate. In enjoining the referendum, the
court reasoned that the "ultimate effect" of the repeal would be to create the impression
that it was lawful to discriminate. Further, the court felt that arguments against open
housing which assume "that rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution still remain
debatable in this community, cannot avoid having a detrimental effect upon the attempted
exercise of constitutional rights." Id. at 996.
45 402 U.S. at 141.
40 281 F. Supp. at 275.
47 293 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969).
48 42 U.S.C. 11§ 2000 at seq. (1970).
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passed, would frustrate federal policy, the court observed that the
referendum was racially motivated. The court stated:
If referenda of this type were consistently permitted, it
would be possible for racially motivated people to totally
prevent implementation of the congressional policy of build-
ing low cost housing outside the ghettos of our cities in order
to ease racial tension and secure a better life for many of our
citizens."
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed on the grounds that HUD
regulations "do not rise to the dignity of federal law,"" and, that
there was insufficient evidence to show that the referendum encouraged
racially discriminatory practices. The court was satisfied that "if the
electors had a legal right to a referendum, their motive in exercising
that right would be immaterial."" The court emphasized the irrele-
vance of motive in a referendum and, unlike the Supreme Court in
Reitman, did not examine its possible effect."
Valtierra, however, went further than Ranjel, in that it did consider
the effect of the referendum but still upheld its constitutionality. The
majority stated that the referendum procedure represents a "devotion
to democracy," reasoning that, even though this procedure "disadvan-
tages" a particular group, "equal protection was not denied."" Mr.
Justice Marshall, in a brief but vigorous dissent, criticized this ra-
tionale and argued that the Court treated the Valtierra referendum
"as if it contained a totally benign, technical, economic classification.""
He noted that the guarantee of equal protection was not peculiar to
racial and ethnic discrimination, but that it also pertained to differ-
entiations based on wealth or poverty. Justice Marshall stated that:
It is far too late in the day to contend that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits only racial discrimination. . . . [Sjing-
ling out the poor to bear a burden not placed on any other
class of citizens tramples the values that the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to protect."
The dissenting opinion is supported by the fact that in California, low-
45 293 F. Supp. at 311.
ao 417 F.2d at 323.
51 Id. at 324.
52 One commentator has criticized the Ranief decision as a mechanical acceptance of
"the right of suffrage . . . regardless of the consequences of its use." Cutler, Legality of
Zoning to Exclude the Poor: A Preliminary Analysis of Evolving Law, 37 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 483, 494 (1971).
53 402 U.S. at 142.
m Id. at 145.
55 Id.	 •
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income housing decisions are the only land use decisions subject to a
mandatory prior approval referendum." By requiring the proponents
of low-income public housing to bear the special burden of obtaining
not only local legislative and HUD approval, but also the prior ap-
proval of the electorate, Article XXXIV is clearly within the ambit
of the "increased legislative burden" rule of Hunter. Furthermore,
by ignoring Article XXXIV's explicit economic classification, the
majority in Valtierra failed to consider the trend of recent cases con-
cerning equal protection for the poor.
The means of providing equality for the poor has been the "new
equal protection' standard which prescribes that only a compelling
state interest can justify legislative classifications made on the basis
of wealth or race when such legislation infringes upon certain funda-
mental rights of citizens. The Supreme Court, in applying the "new
equal protection" standard, has required that the state show not only
a compelling interest which justifies the law, but that the distinctions
drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose." In its
solicitude for the rights of indigents, the Supreme Court has deter-
mined that the right to travel," the right to vote,°° and the right to
criminal appeal" are fundamental rights, and, that classifications which
infringe on these rights cannot be made to turn on one's wealth or
property. Although the Court has never specifically indicated that the
the right to equal housing opportunity is fundamental, the importance
of decent housing and a suitable living environment has been recog-
nized explicitly by Congress" and implicitly by the Supreme Court.° 3
Oa Other public decisions significantly affecting fiscal spending and land use in Cali-
fornia are not subject to the mandatory prior approval of the electorate. For example, a
group may obtain government authorization without prior referendum approval if it wishes
to participate in federal programs securing grants for the construction of highways, 23
U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1970) ; hospitals, 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 et seq. (1970) ; public mental
health centers, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2681 et seq. (1970) ; libraries, 20 US.C. §§ 352 et seq. (1970) ;
and grants to educational institutions providing housing for students and faculty, 12 U.S.C.
{ 1749 (1970).
57
 The term "new equal protection" has been used by various commentators to repre-
sent the Supreme Court's recent application of a more strict standard to the Fourteenth
Amendment protection. For an excellent discussion contrasting the "new equal protection"
standard with the traditional standard see Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning,
Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 767-80 (1969) ; and Comment, De-
velopments in the Law—Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065 (1969).
58
 Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621, 626-28 (1969) ; Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 30-33 (1968). See also Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 785, 471 P.2d
487, 500-01 (1970) where a state court evaluates how the Supreme Court reviews
economic classifications.
59 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
50 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
61 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
52 See text at notes 15-17 supra.
63 See Block v. Hirsh, 265 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) ; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
612
CASE NOTES
In this regard, the rationale of a recent California Supreme Court
decision which held education to be a fundamental right provides a
persuasive analogy for a determination that the right to housing is
similarly fundamental.
In Serrano v. Priest," the court ruled invalid the state's program
of school financing through local property taxes. The court noted that
"education is a major determinant of an individual's chances for eco-
nomic and social success in our competitive society" and that it has "a
unique influence on a child's development as a citizen and his par-
ticipation in political and community life."" Although there was no
precedent for finding that public education is a fundamental right, the
Serrano court found ample justification for such a determination in the
recognition given education by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board
of Education."' The Court there stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance
laws and the great expenditures for education both demon-
strate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society."
Determining that the right to public education is fundamental, the
Serrano court concluded that local control of public education did not
provide a sufficient "compelling state interest" to justify the resultant
inequality of education between communities."
Like education, decent housing and a suitable living environment
are major determinants "of an individual's chances for economic and
social success in our competitive society. . . ."" The importance of
the equal opportunity to acquire adequate housing may be seen in the
interrelationship between housing and the availability of other private
and public services. Frequently, the location of a family's home de-
termines the quality of education, recreation and work that will be
available to the family members. 7° Since access to adequate housing is
often vital in the acquisition of at least one fundamental right, educa-
tion, it appears that the right to housing should similarly be considered
fundamental. With such a determination, the economic justification for
(1917) ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968).
64 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971).
66 Id. at 615-16, 487 P.2d 1255-56.
68 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
er Id. at 493.
88 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20, 487 P.2d at 1259-60.
69 Id. at 616, 487 P.2d at 1256.
70 See, Toward Better Housing for Low Income Families, Report of the President's
Task Force on Low Income Housing 14 (1970).
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requiting a refêrendum on government assisted low-income housing
would not appear to be a state interest sufficiently compelling to
warrant procedural distinctions between low-income and other types of
housing.
In upholding California's referendum on low-income housing, the
Valtierra decision runs counter to a number of recent, lower federal
court decisions which indicate that communities may have an affirma-
tive duty to provide for the housing needs of their poor. In Southern
Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization (SASSO) v. Union City,n the
Spanish Speaking Organization had obtained a city ordinance authoriz-
ing the rezoning of an area of land in order to construct a federally
financed low-income housing project. The ordinance was repealed,
however, in a subsequent citywide referendum. SASSO brought an
action challenging both the legality of the state's submission of zoning
matters to referendum and the referendum result. The court sustained
the validity of the referendum since no discriminatory motive had
been shown, but in dictum noted that:
If, apart from voter motive, the result of this zoning by
referendum is discriminatory in this fashion, in our view a
substantial constitutional question is presented. . .. Given the
recognized importance of equal opportunities in housing, it
may well be, as matter of law, that it is the responsibility of a
city and its planning officials to see that the city's plan as
initiated or as it develops accommodates the needs of its low-
income families, who usually—if not always—are members
of minority groups."
This language not only reiterates the Reitman rationale that the effect
of a referendum is the critical factor in determining constitutionality,
but goes beyond to suggest that a municipality may have an affirmative
duty to plan for the housing needs of low-income families.
The affirmative duty to plan for low-income housing was judicially
imposed in Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna." In
that case, the city rezoned for public park purposes an area which had
been zoned for low-income housing. The plaintiffs, indigents who had in-
tended to purchase the low-cost dwellings to be built on the site,
brought an action against the city, charging that the rezoning con-
stituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The city claimed
that the zoning change was necessitated by sewage problems that
would become uncontrollable and costly if housing were to be con-
71 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
72 Id. at 295-96.
73 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).
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structed on the site. The 'court held that the rezoning was unconstitu-
tional because it denied equal protection of the law to the plaintiffs.
Since the city had never considered alternate methods of dealing with
the sewage problem, which would permit the construction of the low-
income housing, the court further held that the rezoning had not been
prompted by a compelling local interest justifying the infringement of
the plaintiffs' rights. Although Kennedy Park Homes did not involve
the submission of a zoning decision to referendum approval, as did
SASSO, the Kennedy Park Homes court cited that decision to support
its determinination that city officials had an affirmative duty to con-
sider alternative means of accommodating low-income housing in their
Community.
Clearly, Valtierra has not overturned these decisions since the
issue as to whether local governments had an affirmative duty to plan
for the housing needs of the poor was not decided by the Court. Never-
theless, Valtierra sanctions a procedure which precludes independent
"affirmative" action by local governmental officials in providing for the
housing needs of the poor. It is to be hoped that Valtierra constitutes
only a temporary delay in the establishment of a fundamental right
to housing. Unfortunately, however, the decision is an obstacle to any
future Supreme Court determination that local officials have an affirma-
tive duty to consider low-income housing in community planning.
The Valtierra decision may also be suggestive of the Supreme
Court's negative response" to state decisions which have held that
citizen concern over increased municipal expenditures does not justify
exclusionary residential zoning. In National Land and Investment Co.
v. Easttown Bd. of Adjustments,74 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held a four-acre minimum lot zoning requirement unconstitutional. The
court found the zoning ordinance unlawful because it excluded from
the community those who were unable to purchase that much land.
In rejecting the argument that the zoning requirement was intended to
restrict the size of the community in order to limit the need for costly
public services, the court noted that when the primary purpose of a
zoning ordinance "is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to
avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the administration
of public services and facilities [it] can not be held valid."'
The municipal cost justification for a minimum lot size zoning
restriction was again rejected by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
In Re Kit -Mar Builders Inc." In that case, the court invalidated two-
and three-acre minimum Iot zoning requirements, stating that towns
74 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
75 Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612.
7' 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
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cannot choose to "keep out'people•rather than make community im-
provements."77
 Although this type of exclusionary zoning was not in
issue in Valtierra, the Supreme Court has essentially repudiated the
Pennsylvania court's reasoning that increased public spending should
not be determinative in matters that directly affect housing. The
Valtierra Court clearly indicated that the consideration of increased
local government expenditures for public services was a justifiable
basis for the exclusion, through use of the referendum, of low-income
housing projects.78
While it is true that increased costs for community services are a
necessary element of local governmental decision-making, the ultimate
effect of these cost decisions must be considered. The Supreme Court
in Shapiro v. Thompson," which held that state residency requirements
for welfare eligibility constituted a denial of equal protection, ruled
that:
[The state] may legitimately attempt to limit its expendi-
tures, whether for public assistance, public education, or any
other program. But a state may not accomplish such a pur-
pose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens.
It could not, for example, reduce expenditures for education
by barring indigent children from its schools."
Similarly, a local government, by its own action or by submission to a
referendum, should not be permitted to limit expenditures for public
services by barring low-income families from its community, or by
failing to provide housing for its own low-income residents. The
Valtierra Court's indication that the construction of low-income
housing may be lawfully prevented by taxpayers wishing to limit local
government expenditures serves to reinforce the legality of economic
discrimination. In light of the fundamental importance of adequate
housing, however, the local interest in limiting public expenditures does
not appear compelling in view of the critical shortage of housing for
low-income groups.
The Supreme Court's determination in Valtierra that issues
regarding low-income housing may be submitted to the referendum
process substantially limits the protection afforded low-income minor-
ities under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's refusal to recog-
nize the right to adequate housing as fundamental permits local
77
 Id. at 474, 268 A.2d at 768.
78 "This procedure ensures that all the people of a community will have a voice in
a decision which may lead to large expenditures of local governmental funds for increased
public services and to lower tax revenues." 402 U.S. at 143.
79 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
88 Id. at 633.
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governing bodies to implement subtle schemes of economic discrimina-
tion; it also ignores the relationship between the location of a person's
home and the availability of public and private services fundamental
to the attainment of economic and social equality. For the foregoing
reasons, the Supreme Court should reconsider the rationale of Valtierra.
The federal low-income housing policy and future construction of low-
income housing will be jeopardized if, by referendum, a community
can exclude all federally assisted low-income housing projects. The
implications of such a proposition are far-reaching for, without federal
funds, the housing needs of the poor will never be met. It is therefore
urged that decisions pertaining to low-income housing, like the open-
'housing legislation in Hunter, should be removed from the require-
ments of mandatory referenda approval.
THOMAS J. MIZO
Consumer Law—Class Actions—Waiver of Defense Clauses—Vas-
quez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County.'—The petitioners,
purchasers of food freezers and frozen food plans, brought a class suit,
on behalf of themselves and all other purchasers similarly situated,
against the seller and several assignee finance companies,' seeking
rescission of the sales contracts and damages. The petitioners charged
common law fraud' and violations of the California Retail Installment
Sales Act (Unruh Act) . 4 They alleged that salesmen of the seller,
using a memorized sales presentation, had fraudulently represented
that (1) the seller's freezers were guaranteed for life; (2) the freezers
were being sold at reasonable retail prices; and (3) the frozen food
plans provided a seven-month food supply at one-seventh the normal
retail price. The petitioners contended that a class action' for fraud
was appropriate because identical misrepresentations concerning the
price and quality of the goods sold had been made to all class members
and because all class members had suffered similar damage.'
1 4 Cal. 2d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
2 The installment sales contracts of the defendant meat company had been routinely
assigned to three finance companies named as defendants. Id. at 806, 484 P.2d at 966-67,
94 Cal, Rptr. at 798-99.
3 See Ach v. Finkelstein, 264 Cal. App. 2d 667, 674, 70 Cal. Rptr. 472, 477 (1968),
for discussion of the California requirements for a fraud action.
4 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1801 et seq. (West Supp. 1971). This statute regulates consumer
financing practices and prescribes specific civil penalties for violations. The violation al-
leged in the principal case was that the seller had required the execution of two sales
documents, a practice prohibited by § 1803.2 of the Unruh Act, which requires that
every retail installment contract be contained in a single document.
5 Cal. Code Civ. Pro. 11 382 (West 1954). This section authorizes a representative
action in California.
In addition, the petitioners contended that a class action was the only suit they
could feasibly bring because of the small size of each individual claim. 4 Cal. 3d at 816,
484 P.2d at 974, 94 Cal, Rptr, at 806.
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